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Abstract-In this article we treat in some detail the problem of designing mechanisms that will allow us to deal 
with two type\ of novel language: (I) text requiring scheme learning; and (2) the understanding of novel 
metaphorical use of verbs. Schema learning is addressed by four types of processes: schema composition, 
secondary effect elevation, schema alteration, and volitionalization. The processing of novel metaphors 
depends on a decompositional analysis of verbs into “event shape diagrams,” along with a matching process 
that uses semantic marker-like information, to construct novel meaning structures. The examples we describe 
have been chosen to be types that occur commonly, so that rules that we need to understand them can also be 
used to undersland a much wider range of novel language. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Natural language understanding systems are interesting to the extent that they understand 
material that they were never explicitly programmed to handle. A system such as ELIZA[lI or 
PARRY [2], which operates primarily by pattern matching, is less interesting than a system 
which has a set of general rules that can be used to generate a meaning representation for 
unanticipated inputs. There are a wide variety of types of unanticipated input. Some examples 
are: 
(a) New instances of known case frames, scripts, or plans. Each of these can be a kind of 
novel language in the sense that sentences never seen before can be processed appropriately. 
This may mean that information is retrieved from a data base on request, or that a represen- 
tation of a news story is constructed and remembered, or that a question is answered about an 
earlier dialogue, and so on. If the general rules in a system are good ones, then a relatively small 
number of rules will allow a program to handle a wide variety of inputs, most of which were 
never explicitly anticipated by the programmer of the system. This is the simplest ype of novel 
language, and is by now so familiar that it hardly seems to be a way of dealing with novel 
language at all. 
(b) Isolated novel words that have to be understood in context. Some work has been done 
in this area by Granger[3]. Whenever we can extract a meaning structure for a sentence in 
context, we have some hope of guessing the meaning of a novel word. For example, if we were 
told: 
When the tank got low, John filled his car with gasohol. 
A system that had some scriptal knowledge in the automobile domain could guess that 
gasohol was a kind of fuel, or possibly a fluid to substitute for oil, water or antifreeze, or by 
some stretch of the imagination, gasohol might be something to put in a tank that just happens 
to be being transported by the car. Several types of information can be used to constrain the 
possible meanings for gasohol: it is something that can be the instrument of “fill”, something 
that a car is filled with, probably its tank, that since the tank got low, something, probably the 
car or John, was using up the substance in the tank. 
(c) Combinations of words that denote items never before known to a system. Examples in 
(a) above shade into others where concepts are referenced that are novel to a system. For 
example, complex noun phrases can use familiar words to construct novel items, as in the 
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. . . engine housing acid damage report summary.. 
Here, all the words (engine, housing, etc.) may be known, but the phrase taken as a whole 
denotes an item that may never have been encountered before by the system., A program that 
“understands” this phrase could create an internal representation for the item, and infer 
properties about the item, e.g. that the item was the summary part of a report, that the report 
was about engine housing acid damage, that the material of the engine housing is probably 
metal, that the acid damage was to the housing, that acid damage to metal is called “corrosion”, 
and so on. From this information, a system could recognize paraphrases and a variety of 
references to the same item. 
(d) Events that are novel, as in the example: 
My dachshund bit our postman on the ear. 
Waltz[5] lays out mechanisms that would allow a system to generate the working equivalent of 
a mental image for this sentence, attempt to simulate the running of a “mental image” 
corresponding to the sentence, and from the difficulties encountered in running the mental 
image simulation, judge that the sentence was at least mildly implausible. 
(e) New schemas, describing oal-oriented sequences of actions that may never have been 
encountered before, as in hearing and understanding the nature of skyjacking for the first 
time[6]. Here, the understanding consists of first untangling the motivations for each of the 
participants, accounting for each of the actions that are part of the overall schema, and 
generalizing the schema so that novel occurrences of similar schemas can remind the system of 
the original schema. 
(f) Novel metaphors and analogies. Here the variety of language that requires explanation is 
staggering. Understanding metaphorical language first requires noting that the language is 
metaphorical, that is that it couldn’t be literal descriptive text. (This in turn requires an internal 
model of what is ordinary, expected, or possible, that a system can use to judge the plausibility 
of novel language-see item (d) above.) Next, information from the “base domain”, that is the 
domain in which the language has literal meaning, must be somehow transferred (with 
appropriate modifications) to the “target domain”, i.e. the domain which is actually being 
described. As an example, given the sentence: 
John ate up the compliments. 
we would want to transfer material such .as pleasure, desire and “ingestion” (suitably modified) 
from the eating domain to the communication domain. The result can become the basis for 
learning about a new abstract domain or it may simply be that a metaphor allows one to express 
in a few words many notions about a target domain that would otherwise require a much 
lengthier exposition. In any case, a system should also keep some record of its metaphor 
understanding process, so that subsequent processing of similar metaphors would be eased. 
In this article, we look in more detail at the problem of designing mechanisms that will allow 
us to deal with the types of novel language described in (e) and (f) above, namely schema 
learning and the understanding of metaphors. This work is just beginning. The examples we 
describe have been chosen to be types that occur commonly, so that rules that we need to 
understand them can be used to also understand a much wider range of novel language. 
However, we must note that there is only so far that rules can take us: ultimately the power of 
systems will depend on the sheer amount of knowledge they have, knowledge which can be 
used as the base domain for new metaphors, and schemas that can be used to build yet more 
schemas. Therefore, to really achieve something resembling common sense, we will have to 
exercise our rules on whatever base information we have, building a yet larger base on which 
the rules can operate recursively. This important process is meant o be a first-order model of 
the process of adult knowledge acquisition through language. 
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2. SCHEMA LEARNING 
In this section we examine the problem of processing texts that express unfamiliar concepts. 
Acquiring some grasp of those new concepts is an essential aspect of processing such texts. 
This is different from learning new words from context. The distinction here is between 
unfamiliar words that express familiar concepts and familiar words that express unfamiliar 
concepts. The former problem has been somewhat studied (Selfridge, Granger, Anderson, 
Langley). The latter has not. 
How can familiar words express unfamiliar concepts? After all, knowing a word entails 
knowing the set of concepts corresponding to its various word senses. While this is true, words 
in aggregate often can be used to express concepts beyond the simple composition of their 
meanings. These larger concepts have variously been termed frames[7,8], schemas[9,10], 
scripts [1 I] or MOPS [12]. Structures corresponding to these larger concepts are used to organize 
world knowledge in artificial intelligence systems, and play a crucial role in the understanding 
process in natural language systems (e.g. [13-171. We will use the (relatively) neutral term 
“schema” to refer to these knowledge structures. 
Very briefly, schemas are used in natural anguage processing as follows. A text is input to 
the system. The schemas relevant to the situations described in the text are selected and 
activated. Schema selection is a difficult problem, outside the domain of this paper. There have 
been several approaches (e.g. [ 17-191). 
After schema ctivation, text sentences are interpreted with respect o the chosen schemas. 
For each situation the corresponding schema supplies normal causal and temporal connections 
among events, a specification of what is important and what is not, preconditions and 
postconditions, etc. Thus, the use of schemas facilitates the task of constructing a unified 
conceptual representation for the text as a whole. In some systems[l7,20] the schemas are also 
used to aid in word and sentence interpretation. 
Now we can ask a crucial question: What can a natural anguage system do if it does not 
have an appropriate schema for understanding a new input text? As a partial answer, we will 
introduce a new kind of learning called Explanatory Schema Acquisition. As the name implies, 
it is used to acquire schemas. It is not a universal earning technique. The method will be 
applied only to acquisition of volitional schemas, i.e. schemas used by people in problem 
solving situations. Furthermore, it builds on knowledge already in the system and so it is not 
immediately applicable to learning a system’s first schemas. Even with non-schema nd first 
schema learning ruled out, a very large and interesting class of learning remains. In fact, it 
seems that a very large fraction of human adult learning is of this kind. It encompasses learning 
schemas from instruction, from observation of others, from untutored examples, and from 
fortuitous accidents. 
The main argument hat will be advanced is that acquiring schemas involves generalizing 
structures made up of old and familiar schemas which are combined in novel ways. The 
generalizing process itself is performed through consideration of the interactions between the 
effects, preconditions and slot filler constraints upplied by the component schemas. 
Thus, the method is a knowledge based one. It is capable of one trial learning. Moreover, it 
relies very little on inductively acquired correlational experience. 
2.1 An example 
To clarify the procedure, consider an example. This example is a story about a kidnapping, 
Let us assume that we, the readers of this example, do not yet have a schema for kidnapping or 
extortion or any similar notion. We do, however, assume the knowledge of a considerable 
quantity of background information about stealing, bargaining, the use of normal physical 
objects. and goals of people and institutions. 
Example story: 
Paris police disclosed Tuesday that a man who identified himself as Jean Maraneaux 
abducted the Il-yr-old daughter of wealthy Parisian businessman Michel Boullard late last 
week. Boullard received a letter containing a snapshot of the kidnapped girl. The next day 
he received a telegram demanding that 1 million francs be left in a lobby waste basket of 
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the crowded Pompidou Center in exchange for the girl. Asking that the police not 
intervene, Boullard arranged for the delivery of the money. His daughter was found 
wandering blindfolded with her hands bound near his downtown office on Monday. 
A KIDNAPPING schema, if we had one, would contain information to help us make sense 
of the story. With it, processing the story would be relatively easy. 
But by assumption we do not know about kidnapping. Therefore some events in the story 
are incomprehensible. In particular we cannot explain why Maraneaux might steal Boullard’s 
daughter. While this is quite clearly an instance of taking something that belongs to someone 
else, there is no motivation for it. The daughter has no apparent value to Boullard; a person, 
unlike money, cannot be used to acquire other valued goods. Any schema-based understander 
requires motivations for major volitional actions (such as a character invoking the STEAL 
schema). Therefore, this input seems anomalous. 
The confusion is resolved by the next sentence. This input invokes the BARGAIN schema. 
We know immediately the motivation for Maraneaux trying to bargain with Boullard: he is 
trying to acquire money. Possessing money is a common goal that can be attributed to most 
people. Thus, it serves as an understandable motivation for the bargaining. Furthermore, 
stealing the girl is now motivated: Maraneaux used the STEAL schema to satisfy a pre- 
condition of the BARGAIN schema. The precondition states that the bargain is unlikely to 
work unless each party indeed possesses the item he plans to trade away. 
Thus far we have done nothing new. Previous systems have proposed understanding new 
text inputs via analysis of goals and plans of the characters [2, 16, 211. These systems tend to be 
more oriented toward “planning” or “problem solving” than “script application”. 
Once the story has been understood in this way it might already be viewed as a new schema. 
The system could file away the representation as a method by which a particular person 
(Maraneaux) can procure a particular amount of money (1 million francs) by a particular action 
(stealing Boullard’s daughter and offering to trade her back for the money). This is a mistake for 
several reasons. The most important is that it is simply far too specific. 
Our concern here is how a system might do better than to simply file away a very specific 
plan. Our contention is that the same knowledge used to process the input in the first place can 
be used to make the schema more general. For example, the system has the knowledge 
necessary to prove that if Maraneaux wanted 100,000 francs instead of 1 million, that the same 
plan would work. It can do this because the system knows the function of the million francs in 
Maraneaux’s plan. It knows that the money is traded by Boullard for the return of his daughter. 
Also it knows that the preconditions for Boullard’s acceptance of the proposed bargain are that 
(1) Boullard must value his daughter’s afety more than the money and (2) that Boullard must 
have access to that amount of money. Clearly, since 1 million francs satisfies these require- 
ments, any amount less than 1 million francs also satisfies the requirements and would have 
worked. Sums larger than a million francs might work as well provided they do not violate (1) 
or (2) above. We have been a bit sloppy in our analysis. To understand Maraneaux’s actions it is 
not important in reality for Boullard to have access to the money but only for Maraneaux to 
believe he does, and for Maraneaux to believe Boullard values his daughter. Nonetheless, the 
point is well made: this event can be generalized through knowledge-based manipulations using 
information that had to be in the system anyway in order for the story to be understood. In a 
like manner the identity of Boullard, his daughter, and Maraneaux are not important. What is 
important are that these roles be played by people with certain relationships to other people and 
things. The required relationships are dictated by the volitional actions required of the people 
by the schema. After these knowledge-based generalizations have been made, the specific event 
can be transformed into a KIDNAP schema. 
In general, the newly generalized schemas require further refinement. Due to eccentricities 
in the input story, the schema may lack information. For example, if the first kidnapping story 
seen by the system reported the kidnappers uccessfully escaping with the ransom even though 
they killed the hostage, the system might acquire a distorted concept of kidnapping. Even more 
frequent are cases where the first schema constructed is correct but incomplete. This might 
result from situations where there are alternate methods of achieving certain sub-goals, only 
one of which is reported. Clearly, schema modification is essential. Thus, the system’s chemas 
must constantly be adjusted and refined in reaction to normal input processing. 
2.2 The generalization process 
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There are two problems that the generalization process must face. The first is to know when 
it should be applied. Clearly, every input text ought not to cause the system to construct a new 
schema. Only “interesting” inputs should invoke the schema acquisition system. The second 
problem is how to perform the generalization. There are a number of subproblems here, for 
example, selecting which events and objects should be generalized, imposing limits on the 
extent of generalization, and actually carrying out the schema modification. 
There are four situations which when recognized in the text either individually or in 
combination ought to invoke the generalizatiop routines. They are: 
Schema composition 
Secondary effect elevation 
Schema alteration 
Volitionalization. 
In the first part of this section we will illustrate each of these situations with an example. 
2.2.1 Schema composition. The first situation we will discuss is called schema composition. 
Basically, it involves composing known schemas in a novel way. Typically, this will involve a 
primary schema, essentially unchanged, with one or more of its preconditions atisfied in a 
novel way by other known schemas. 
An example of this was seen in the above kidnapping story. In that story, the primary 
schema is BARGAIN, a schema which we assumed the system already knew. One of the 
preconditions specified in the BARGAIN schema is that each party to the bargain must 
convince the other that he can indeed deliver his side of the bargain. For Maraneaux, this 
corresponds to making Boullard believe that he (Maraneaux) has control of Boullard’s daughter 
an can, therefore, relinquish the girl to him. Maraneaux achieves this by actually establishing 
control over the daughter (via an instance of the STEAL schema) and then sending Boullard a 
photograph. To the system, this is a novel way to satisfy BARGAIN’s preconditions. We know 
this must be novel to the system because if it were not, the system would already have a 
schema in which this precondition of BARGAIN was satisfied by an application of STEAL. But 
by hypothesis, the system does not yet possess a kidnapping schema nd therefore, cannot yet 
know of this method of satisfying the precondition. Thus, a precondition of a known schema 
has been satisfied in an interesting new way, and a new schema must be constructed to capture 
the underlying eneralization. 
2.2.2 Secondary effect elevation. Consider the following scenario: 
Fred wanted to date only Sue, but Sue steadfastly refused his overtures. Fred was on the 
verge of giving up when he saw what happened to his friend, John: John wanted to date 
Mary but she also refused. John started seeing Wilma. Mary became jealous and the next 
time he asked her, Mary eagerly accepted. Fred told Sue that he was going to make a date 
with Lisa. 
Here Fred has not acquired a new schema; he has used an existing schema (DATE) in a new 
way. This is called secondary effect elevation. Fred’s DATE schema lready contains all of the 
knowledge necessary for resolving his dilemma. The problem is that the normal DATE schema is 
organized in the wrong way. In secondary effect elevation situations an existing schema is 
annotated indicating that the schema may be used to achieve a result which is normally neutral 
or negative. 
The main purpose of the DATE schema is to satisfy certain recurring social goals (like 
companionship, sex, etc.). DATE contains secondary effects as well. These are often undesir- 
able effects accompanying the main, planned effects. For example, one is usually monetarily 
poorer after a date. Another secondary effect is that if one has an old girlfriend, she may 
become jealous of a new date. 
What Fred learned from John’s experience is that it is occasionally useful to invoke the 
DATE schema in order to cause one of its secondary effects (jealousy) while completely 
ignoring the usual main goal. 
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Just as with schema composition, the existing schema is changed to reflect a generalization 
made from a specific instance. In this case, the specific instance is John’s interactions with 
Mary. Notice, however, that Fred did not simply copy John’s actions. John actually made a date 
with Wilma while Fred only expressed an intention to date Lisa. This is not an earth-shaking 
difference, but in the context of dating it is extremely significant. In the normal DATE situation 
expressing an intention to date someone is not nearly so satisfying as an actual date. Once 
modified for the purpose of causing jealousy, however, expressing an intention for a date and 
actually carrying it out can be equally effective. 
One might argue that the distinction between main and secondary effects of a schema is 
otiose and, in situations uch as this, even deleterious. After all, DATE already had all of the 
information ecessary for solving Fred’s problem. If a system simply treats all of the effects of 
a schema the same, then any effect can be singled out during the planning process to be used as 
the main goal. There is, however, a strong argument against his position. The possible desired 
effects of a schema do not exist only within the schema itself. They are used to organize and 
select among schemas in both understanding and planning applications (see [14] and [18]). Many 
effects (like feeling more tired after a date than before) will not be used in the normal planning or 
understanding process. If they are treated the same as legitimate main goals the system will be 
swamped in a combinatorial quagmire of undifferentiated possibilities, most of which are wildly 
implausible. For example, we do not want our understanding process to predict hat John will take a 
nap when it is told that John dated Mary. Given the input “John took a nap” the system ought o be 
able to justify it. However, it ought not actively predict it. Given the multiplicity of individual 
actions making up the DATE schema (each with its own set of effects) the vast majority of the 
effects from this scheme (and any other schema) are simply irrelevant o overall planning and 
understanding processes. Instead, we would like our system to single out the plausible volitional 
effects of its schemas and use only those for schema organization and selection. Thus, in our 
example, Fred has constructed, via secondary effect elevation, a new use of the DATE schema. 
2.2.3 Schema alteration. Schema alteration involves modifying a nearly correct schema so 
that it fits the requirements of a new situation. The alteration process is guided by the system’s 
world model. This is illustrated by the following brief anecdote: 
Recently I had occasion to replace temporarily a broken window in my back door with a 
plywood panel. The plywood sheet from which the panel was to be cut had a “good” side 
and a “bad” side (as does most raw lumber). The good side was reasonably smooth while 
the bad side had several ruts and knot holes. I automatically examined both sides of the 
sheet (presumably as part of my SAWING or CUTTING-A-BOARD-TO-FIT schema) and 
selected the good side to face into the house with the bad side to be exposed to the 
elements. After I had cut the panel and fitted it in place I noticed that several splinters had 
been torn out leaving ruts in the “good” side. I immediately saw the problem. Hand saws 
only cut in one direction. With hand saws, the downward motion does the cutting while the 
upward motion only repositions the cutting blade for another downward motion. I had cut 
the wood panel with the “good” side facing down. The downward cutting action has a 
tendency to tear splinters of wood out of the lower surface of the board. Since the good side 
was the lower surface, it suffered the loss of splinters. If I had to perform the same action 
again, I would not make the same mistake. I would cut the board with the good side facing 
up. However, what I learned was not just a simple specialized patch to handle this 
particular instance of splintering. Since I knew the cause of the splintering, I knew that it 
would not always be a problem: it is only a problem when (1) the lumber is prone to 
splintering, (2) there is a “good” side of the board that is to be preserved, and (3) one is 
making a crosscut (across the wood’s grain) rather than a rip cut (along the grain). 
Moreover, the solution is not always to position the wood with the good side up. My 
electric saber saw (also a reciprocating saw) cuts during the upward blade motion rather 
than the downward motion. Clearly, the solution when using the saber saw is the opposite: 
to position the board with the good side down. Now, these are not hard and fast rules: with 
a sufficiently poor quality sheet of plywood splintering would likely always be a problem. 
Rather, these are useful heuristics that lead to a refinement of the SAWING schema. 
Note that this refinement to the SAWING schema is far more general than required to handle 
the particular problem that gave rise to it. The refinement contains contingencies relevant o the 
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use of saber saws even though no saber saw was used in the immediate problem. This is 
possible because the refinement is driven by world model, not just the problem. The SAWING 
schema was altered by identifying and eliminating the offending cause in the underlying 
knowledge-based xplanation of the phenomena. 
2.2.4 Volitionalization. This situation involves transforming a schema for which there is no 
planner (like VEHICLE-ACCIDENT, ROULETTE, etc.) into a schema which can be used be a 
planner to attain a specific goal. Consider the following story: 
Herman was his grandfather’s only living relative. When Herman’s business was failing he 
decided to ask his grandfather for a loan. They had never been close but his grandfather was 
a rich man and Herman knew he could spare the money. When his grandfather refused, 
Herman decided he would do the old fellow in. He gave him a vintage bottle of wine spiked 
with arsenic. His grandfather died. Herman inherited several million dollars and lived 
happily ever after. 
This story is a paraphrase of innumerable mystery stories and illustrates a schema familiar 
to all who-done-it readers. It might be called the HEIR-ELIMINATES-BENEFACTOR 
schema. It is produced via volitionalization by modifying the existing non-volitional schema 
INHERIT. INHERIT is non-volitional since there is no active agent. The schema simply 
dictates what happens to a person’s possessions when he dies. 
In this example, volitionalization parallels schema composition. One of the preconditions to 
INHERIT is that the individual be dead. The ELIMINATE-BENEFACTOR schema uses the 
schema MURDER to accomplish this. One major difference is that schema composition 
requires all volitional schemas. This parallelism need not always be present, however. Non- 
volitional to volitional transformation is also applicable to removing stochastic causal steps 
from a schema resulting in a volitional one. 
2.3 Limits on generalization 
Basically, the generalization process is based on certain data dependency links established 
during understanding. 
After a story is understood, the understood representation can be viewed as an explanation 
of why the events are plausible. For example, take the case of a kidnapping. KIDNAP is an 
instance of schema composition, not unlike RANSOM. Thus, the first kidnapping story seen by 
the system is understood as a THEFT followed by a BARGAIN. If the kidnapper is successful, 
the ransom is paid. For a system to understand this, it must justify that the person paying 
values the safety of the kidnapped victim more than the ransom money. This justification is a 
data dependency[22] link to some general world knowledge (e.g. that a parent loves his 
children). Now the event can be generalized so long as these data dependency links are 
preserved. Clearly, as long as the data dependencies are preserved, the underlying events will 
still form a believable whole. 
Consider again the secondary effect elevation example of Fred trying to date Sue. The 
observed specific instance is John’s interactions with Mary. Notice, however, that Fred did not 
simply copy John’s actions. John actually made a date with Wilma while Fred only expressed 
an intention to date Lisa. This is not an earth-shaking difference, but in the context of dating it 
is extremely significant. In the normal DATE situation expressing an intention to date someone 
is not nearly so satisfying as an actual date. Once modified for the purpose of causing jealousy, 
however, expressing an intention for a date and actually carrying it out can be equally effective. 
That is, they both maintain the data dependency link for why we believe that Sue is in fact 
jealous. 
Likewise, in the alteration example the schema for preserving one side of a board while 
sawing can be generalized. The resulting schema is applicable to circular saws, jig saws, etc. as 
well as hand saws. Again this is due to the preservation of a data dependency link: we believe 
that the wood’s surface is preserved because the surface is supported by the rest of the board 
during deformation due to the saw’s teeth. As long as we know which direction the teeth point 
on a saw, we know how to orient the board to preserve its good side. 
3.4 Comparison to previous work 
How does this method compare to other learning systems? There are a number of previous 
learning systems that spring to mind: Schank’s MOPS [ 121. Selfridge’s language l arning model Ml, 
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Soloway’s program to learn the rules of baseball[25] and SRI STRIPS systeml371. The system 
outlined is strikingly different from Schank’s and Selfridge’s. It has some interesting similarities to 
Soloway’s and one part of the STRIPS system. 
While the domain of Schank’s MOPS is similar to the described system, the learning technique 
used with MOPS is very different. The systems of Kolodner[38] and Lebowitz[20] both made 
“generalizations” but these are all of the correlational variety and might better be termed 
“specializations”. IPPS generalization that Italian terrorists tend to shoot people in the knee caps, 
for example, is actually a correlational constraint noticed in the pre-existing terrorism MOP. The 
result is actually a specialized terrorism MOP to be applied only to Italian terrorist stories which 
makes a prediction about shooting in knee caps. Learning in both IPP and CYRUS is of this variety. 
Their approach precludes the kind of learning that extends a system’s range of processing. 
Lebowitz’s general terrorism MOP could not in principle be learned by his system. In the example 
outlined, the system learned an EXTORT schema without having a more general version already 
built in. 
Selfridge’s ystem was concerned with learning sentence structure and the names of already 
existing concepts. It learned, for example, that the words “put on” can refer to the already 
defined algorithmic oncept “get dressed in”. The domain of my system is learning the original 
concepts. It might be interesting to explore how these ideas could be applied to language 
learning but that would not be the main thrust. 
Soloway’s system is similar to the one outlined here in that it has the flavor of one-trial or 
“insight” learning. Furthermore, he made use of general background goal information (in the 
form of notions such as competition) to aid in processing. However, the domain of learning 
baseball rules from game descriptions is very different from learning process schemata. Also, 
the purpose of his system is very different. It did not try to extend the range of its processing in 
an open-ended way. Rather, it tried to induce general rules from instances. In that sense it is 
more of an inductive inference system. 
The MACROPS idea of SRIs are similar in that they result in new processing structures 
which can in turn be combined to form yet other structures. However, the domain of planning 
paths around blocks and through doors is much more constrained and simplified. Furthermore, 
the MACROPS structures were built from a successful planning search through the problem 
space, not in the midst of processing inputs. This makes STRIPS very inward motivated in its 
learning. 
2.5 Conclusion 
There are several concluding points: 
(1) Explanatory schema cquisition does not depend on correlational evidence. Unlike some 
learning system (e.g. [23,24]), it is capable of one trial learning. It is somewhat similar to 
Soloway’s view of learning[25]. 
(2) The approach is heavily knowledge-based. A great deal of background knowledge must 
be present for learning to take place. In this respect explanatory schema cquisition follows the 
current trend in AI learning and discovery systems perhaps traceable to Lenat[26]. 
(3) The learning mechanism is not “failure-driven” as is the MOPS approach[l2]. In that 
view learning takes place in response to incorrect predictions by the system. In explanatory 
acquisition learning can also be stimulated by positive inputs which encounter no particular 
problems or prediction failures. 
(4) The absolute representation power of the system is not enhanced by learning new 
schemas. This statement is only superficially surprising. Indeed, Fodor[27] implies that this 
must be true of all self-consistent learning systems. Explanatory schema acquisition does, 
however, increase processing efficiency. Since all real-world systems are resource limited, this 
learning technique does, in fact, increase the system’s processing power. Furthermore, it may 
indicate how Socratic method learning is possible and why the psychological phenomenon of 
functional fixedness is adaptive. 
3.UNDERSTANDING METAPHOR 
3.1 Importance of metaphor 
Metaphors are pervasive. It is nearly impossible to avoid metaphor in language use, even if 
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the language is technical. For example, hydraulic metaphors are common in economics (e.g. 
economic pressure, cash POW, turning ofl the money supply, draining of assets, etc.). It is not 
possible to talk about love except through metaphor: love can be likened to a journey together, 
a meeting of minds, complementary shapes (as in fitting or belonging together), madness, falling 
into an abyss, transmitting and receiving on the same wavelength, and so on. Jackendoff 1281 has 
argued that metaphor is the basic process by which we acquire proficiency in abstract domains; 
he suggests that as infants, when we encounter a novel domain, we use existing sensory-motor 
schemas to form the basis of schemas uitable for understanding the abstract domain, and that 
this process can continue recursively, using existing abstract schemas as the basis for under- 
standing novel abstract domains. Jackendoff therefore suggests that the surface similarity of 
“Mary kept the ring in a box” and “They kept the business in the family” reflects a deep 
similarity due to the derivation of the abstract domain of possession from the concrete domain 
of position. 
Metaphors can be used to transfer complex combinations of information from one well- 
known domain to another less well known or completely unfamiliar one. Understanding 
metaphorical language first requires noting that the language is metaphorical, that is that it 
couldn’t be literal descriptive text. This in turn requires an internal model of what is ordinary, 
expected, or possible, that a system can use to judge the plausibility of novel language (see for 
example item (d) in the Introduction). Next, material from the “base domain”, that is the 
domain in which the language has literal meaning, must be used to understand the “target 
domain”, that is, the domain which is actually being described. This could be done in a number 
of ways, for example, by establishing links between the base domain of the metaphor and the 
target (novel) domain that the metaphor is being used to describe, or by copying base domain 
structures into a target domain. The result can become the basis for learning about a new 
domain (by transferring knowledge from the base domain selectively) or it may simply be that a 
metaphor allows one to express in a few words many notions about a target domain that would 
otherwise require a much lengthier exposition. Consider for example: 
(Sl) John ate up the compliments. 
or 
(S2) Robbie’s metal egs ate up the space between him and Susie.? 
Assuming that these sentences represented novel uses of the words “ate up”, we might want a 
system to infer that in the first sentence John desired the compliments, eagerly “ingested” them 
with his mind, thereby making them internal and being given pleasure by them, and that in the 
second sentence, the distance between Robbie and Susie was being reduced to zero, just as an 
amount of food is reduced to zero when it is “eaten up”. 
In the following sections I will show methods which will make the correct interpretations of
the two examples above. First, however, I must introduce “event shape diagrams”, a new 
representation scheme for verb meaning, which is used centrally in this method for understand- 
ing novel metaphors.* 
3.2 Event shape diagrams 
In their simplest forms, event shape diagrams have a time line, a scale, and values on the 
scale at one or more points. Diagrams can be used to represent concurrent processes, causation, 
and other temporal relations by aligning two or more diagrams, as illustrated in Fig. 1 which 
shows the representation for “eat”. Note that several simple diagrams are aligned, and that 
each has different kinds of scales, and different event shapes. The top scale corresponds to the 
CD primitive INGEST[29]. Causal relations ho!d betureen the events described in each simpie 
iThIs IS a slightI> modified sentence from Isaac Asimob’s I. Robot. 
-IOnI! verb-based metaphors will be treated here. These methods seem inappropriate for interpreting noun-based 
melaphors such as “John is a ral”. or for “phenomenological metaphors”. such as “I woke up in the morning with a sledge 
hammer banging m ml head”. as well as for others. no doubt. I have not attempted a taxonomy of metaphor types. 
140 G. F. DEJONG and D. L. WALTZ 
r 
ACTI = INGEST (agent, #food 8, (source), digestive-tract (agent) 
2 / IN I (t food +, digestive- tract (agent 1 
E 
i 1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 I-+ -l/2 day ______)) 
I INTEND (agent, +CT I 1 
z loz (snack) 
// FEEL-PLEASURE (agent) 
I;+--!--I 
! I 
lantxipatory direct carryover 
Fig. 1. Event shape diagram for “eat”. 
diagram. The names for the causal relations are adopted from Rieger’s CSA work[30]. The 
action INGEST stops in this default case where “desire to eat” goes to zero. “Desire to eat” 
sums up in one measure coercion, habit, and other factors as well as hunger. Typical values for 
amounts of food, time required to eat, and so on are also associated with the diagram, to be 
used as default values. 
Many adverbial modifiers can be represented neatly: “eat quickly” shrinks the value of 
tr - to with respect to typical values; “eat a lot” increases the values of qo- qf above typical 
values. Similarly “eat only half of one’s meal”, “eat very slowly”, “eat one bite”, etc. can be 
neatly represented. “Eat up” can be represented by making the 
QUANTITY(food/IN 1 (food, digestive-tract (agent))) 
go to zero before the DESIRE (agent, ACT 1) goes to zero. This representation is shown in Fig. 
2. 
The point of time from which events are viewed can also be clearly represented. Past tense 
(e.g. “we ate 3 hamburgers”) puts “now” on the time line to the right of the action, while future 
tense puts “now” to the left of the action, and present progressive (e.g. “we are eating”) puts 
“now” between to and t,. 
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Fig. 2. Event shape diagram for “eat up”. 
More levels of detail can be added if needed. For instance, the action diagram for eating 
ought to have links to more general event shape diagrams representing the typical daily eating 
habits of humans (three meals, one in the early morning, one around noon, and one in the early 
evening, plus between-meal snacks, coupled with diagrams representing the gradual onset of 
desire to eat after a meal); the diagram for “eating” should also have links to more detailed 
event shape diagrams that expand upon the actions involved (eating involves many recurrences 
of putting food in one’s mouth, biting, chewing and swallowing, and the diagram for the amount 
of food inside the agent can reflect a series of stepwise changes as each mouthful is ingested). 
For more detail on event shape diagrams, see [31]. 
3.3 Metaphor with event shape diagrams 
The interpretation of verb-based metaphors is based on the following general principles: 
(1) Both verbs and nouns have inherent selection restrictions. Thus, for the purposes of this 
example, “eat (up)” prefers that its semantic object be food, and foods of various kinds are 
marked by a preference to appear with certain actions, such as “eat”, “buy”, “grow”, 
“prepare , ” “throw away”, etc. (See Finin[4] for discussion of “case frames” for nouns.) 
(2) Nouns are far less likely to be metaphorical than verbs. If a verb and object do not 
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match each others’ selection restrictions, the object should be taken as referring literally, and 
the verb as referring metaphorically. Thus, we can correctly predict that each of the following 
sentences is really about ordinary actions on food, even though literally these actions are very 
remote meanings for each of the verbs: 
(S3) Mary destroyed the food. ( = prepared badly or ate ravenously). 
(S4) Sue made the food disappear. ( = ate up rapidly). 
(SS) John threw the food together. ( = prepared rapidly). 
(3) Understanding of a verb-based metaphor involves (a) selection of candidate meanings 
using the semantic object, (b) matching the event shape diagrams of the candidate meanings 
with both the current context and the event shape diagrams of the actual verb in the sentence. 
If there is more than one basic meaning candidate for a metaphorically used work (as in S2 
above) the most appropriate meaning is selected by testing the various basic meanings in the 
current context to see which fits best. Once a basic meaning is selected, the event shape 
diagrams of this meaning are matched with the event shape diagrams of the actual verb used, 
and some meaning is transferred. The meaning transfer can take two forms: (1) modifying the 
basic meaning, in a manner similar to adverbial modification; and (2) (more interestingly) 
superimposing certain portions of the event shape diagram for the verb actually used in the 
sentence onto the selected basic meaning. 
This process should be clearer after I show examples of its operation on sentences (Sl) and 
(S2). 
3.4 An example 
Consider the processing required to handle the metaphor in 
(Sl) John ate up the compliments. 
Using principle (1) above, we first note that “ate up” prefers food of some kind as a semantic 
object, that “compliments” is not a food, and itself prefers an MTRANS-type verb[24], in 
particular either “tell” or “hear”. Next, using principle (2), we can judge that “compliments” 
refers literally, and so either “tell” or “hear” is probably the true basic verb. The event shape 
diagrams for “tell” and “hear” are shown in Fig. 3. STM means “short term memory” and LTM 
means “long term memory”. These terms are used here with their common sense (non- 
technical) meaning. 
If the sentence appeared in context, we might be able to select the proper basic meaning by 
comparing the two possibilities with our current expectations, but in this case, we have to rely 
on event shape diagram matching to determine the best choice. 
Let us look first at trying to match “tell” with “eat up”. In order to judge the quality of the 
match, we must first describe a scoring scheme. The scoring scheme used here is rather simple: 
it looks for scales that are the same, and matches them, provided the shapes of the scale are 
the same (i.e. both are changes in the positive direction, or both are oc’currences, where an 
occurrence is defined as a change on some scale from a zero to a non-zero value, followed by a 
change back to zero again. In this case, MTRANS matches INGEST-both are occurrences- 
and 
INTEND (agent, MTRANS (agent, compliment, STM (agent), STM (hearer))) 
matches 
INTEND (agent, INGEST (agent, food, [source], digestive-tract (agent))) 
-both are negative changes. There is a serious mismatch between these two, in that STM 
(hearer) does not match digestive-tract (agent) well, and these items are the goal portions of the 
DESIRE, the most important part. 
Now consider the match between “hear” and “eat up”. As before, MTRANS matches 
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Fig. 3(b). Event shape diagram for “hear”. 
INGEST, but now the INTEND postion of “eat up” has no match. However, INI (compliment, 
STM (hearer)) matches IN2 (food, digestive-tract (agent)) very well-both are the major scales 
of their respective verbs, and both have the same “shape”, namely the occurrence shape, and 
finally, IN1 and IN2 are closely related binary predicates. 
The understanding of the metaphor can now be addressed. Understanding in this model is 
the transfer to hear of the “residue” of the meaning of eat up, where by “residue” I mean the 
portion of eat up that had no match with portions of hear. The residue in this case consists of 
the scales for DESIRE, INTEND, QUANTITY and FEEL-PLEASURE that were associated 
with ear up. Theoretically, there are two main options for the mechanism that makes the 
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transfer: (1) the scales may simply be added to the meaning of hear, or (2) some of these scales 
may already be present in latent or potential form as part of our understanding of hear, and the 
transfer would then consist of boosting their prominence, assigning a polarity to them, etc. 
Even within this single example, there are three kinds of issues that lead me to believe that 
option (2) is the right choice in general: first, it is difficult to understand why INTEND cannot 
be transferred to hear unless one realizes that hearing a particular item is not something we can 
ever intend in a causal sense; second, the transfer cannot be literal in any event-for example 
we would not want to infer that compliments remain in our STM for a day, just because food 
may do so; and third, adverbial modification seems to already require scales to be present in 
latent form, as for example in 
(S6) I heard the compliments with great pleasure. 
Taking the second option, then, we can construct a meaning for (Sl), as shown in Fig. 4. 
Figure 4(a) shows the enriched version of hear used to receive the transferred material from ear 
up. Note that although the items below the dotted line are truly part of the meaning of hear, 
these items would not ordinarily be evoked when understanding the word hear, and that really, 
this version of hear represents three meanings, corresponding to “hear”, “hear with pleasure”, 
A ACT 3 = MTRANS 1 speaker, #mental-item +b, STM (speaker,) 
STM (hearer)) 
9 
g 
g 
0 I+-iOsec+ 
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2: 
+ -30 set + 
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$2 __-_ 
-3 
B 
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-- ---- - ------ -_- ----_- --------------________ 
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Fig. 4(a). “encircled” event shape diagram for “hear”. 
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Fig. 4(b). Representation of (9) “John ate up the compliments”. 
and “hear with displeasure”. It would clearly not be difficult to select “hear with pleasure” by 
matching with “eat up”. Figure 4(b) shows the final meaning representation for (Sl). 
Example (S2) 
(S2) Robbie’s metal egs ate up the space between him and Susie. 
can be understood using similar methods, though there are some interesting differences. The 
object of the verb in this case is “space” which is again not an appropriate object for use with 
“eat up”. Again taking the semantic object as the item most likely to refer literally, space 
suggests that the true basic verb in the sentence ought to be PTRANS, i.e. the physical transfer 
of an object through space. “Legs” also play an important part here, constraining the PTRANS 
to be either “run” or “walk” (this requires different processing methods that I have not yet 
investigated very thoroughly). For our purposes, “run” and “walk” look pretty much the same. 
There are some main variants that I believe ought to be represented ifferently, namely the 
meaning suggested by phrases uch as run from (away from) x, run to (toward) y, run (without 
source or goal), run from x to y, and so on. These differ according to whether movement is 
stated with reference to a source, goal, neither or both, and whether or not the motion actually 
starts and/or ends at the source and goal points, or whether these specify only the direction of 
motion. In this case, the QUANTITY of food which goes to zero should make it possible to 
match the “run to” meaning. 
So far, so good, but some interesting issues remain. First, there is little residue to transfer in 
this case, except for the intensification of the DESIRE to be at the goal. In fact, I don’t think that 
this is bad, but there are some inferences that I make in hearing (S2) that cannot be easily accounted 
for using this model. In particular, there is an analogy between taking bites and taking steps, and 
perhaps more important (and possibly related) (S2) seems to focus on the past progressive aspects 
of the action; to my mind the sentence is better paraphrased as “Robbie was running toward Susie” 
than as “Robbie ran to Susie”. Overall, however, the account of the understanding of the two 
metaphors eems to capture roughly the right meanings in a natural and (to me) quite satisfying 
manner: the problems eem to require refinements o the method rather than complete rethinking. 
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I do not want to claim that all metaphors can be handled by methods of the sort that have 
been described above. I do believe that the mechanisms suggested above are particularly good 
and natural for a reasonably rich class of metaphors. There still are holes in the theory, 
however. Consider the following sentence (due to Gentner[32]): 
(S7) The flower kissed the rock. 
I have suggested that objects ought to be taken literally, and indeed, if we do so, we can obtain 
a reasonable reading, namely that a flower bent over and its “face” touched a rock gently. 
However, one could also take the verb literally, and take “rock” and “flower” metaphorically; 
in this case, the sentence could refer to a gentle woman literally kissing a tough man. 
4. CONCLUSION 
This work is just beginning. The examples we describe have been chosen to be types that 
commonly occur, so that rules needed to understand them can also be used to understand a
much wider range of novel language. However, we must note that there is only so far that rules 
can take us: ultimately the power of systems will depend on the sheer amount of knowledge 
they have, knowledge which can be used as the base domain for new metaphors, and schemas 
that can be used to build yet more schemas. Therefore, to really achieve something resembling 
common sense, we will have to exercise our rules on whatever base of information we have, 
building a yet larger base on which the rules can operate recursively. 
REFERENCES 
I. Weizenbaum, ELIZA-a computer program for the study of natural anguage communication between man and 
machine. Comm. ACM 10(8), 474-480 (1966). 
2. K. hi. Colby, B. Faught and R. Parkinson, Pattern matching rules of the recognition of natural language dialogue 
expressions. Stanford AI. Lab., Memo AIM-234 (1976). 
3. R. H. Granger, FOUL-UP: a program that figures out meanings of words from context. Proc. lJCAI-77. M.I.T., 
Cambridge Mass., pp. 172-178, August 1977. 
4. T. W. Finin, The semantic interpretation f nominal compounds. Tech. Rep. T-%, Coordinated Science Lab., Univ. of 
Illinois, Urbana, March 1980. 
5. D. L. Waltz, Toward a detailed model of processing for language describing the physical world. In Pm. IJAl-81, 
Vancouver, B.C., Canada, pp. l-6, August 1981. 
6. G. DeJong, Automatic schema cquisition i  a natural language environment. In Proc. 2nd Annual Nut. Con/. Artificial 
Intel/., Pittsburgh, Penn., August 1982. 
7. M. Minsky, A framework for the representation f knowledge. M.I.T. AI. Rep. TR-306, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass. 
(1974). 
8. E. Charniak, A framed PAINTING: the representation f a common sense knowledge fragment. Cognitive Sci. 4, 
355-394 (1976). 
9. D. Bobrow and D. Norman, Some principles of memory schemata. In Representation and Understanding (Edited by D. 
Bobrow and A. Collins). Academic Press, New York (1975). 
10. W. Chafe, Some thoughts on schemata. In Proc. Workshop on Theoretical Issues in Natural Langunge Processing, 
Cambridge, Mass., June, 1975. 
1 I. R. Schank and R. Abelson, Scripts Plans Goals and Understanding. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, New Jersey (1977). 
12. R. Schank. Language and memory. Cognitive Sci. 4,243-283 (1980). 
13. R. Cullingford, Script application: computer understanding of newspaper stories. Res. Rep. 116, Yale Computer 
Science Department, New Haven, Conn., (1978). 
14. E. Charniak, MS. MALAPROP, a language comprehension system. In Proc. 5th IHCAI, Cambridge, Mass. (1977). 
IS. D. Bobrow, R. Kaplan, M. Kay, D. Norman, H. Thompson and T. Winograd, GUS, a frame driven dialog system. 
Artificial Intel/. 8(l) (1977). 
16. R. Wilensky, Understanding goal-base stories. Ph.D. dissertation, Yale Computer Science Rep. 140, Yale University, 
New Haven, Conn. (1978). 
17. G. DeJong, Skimming stories in real time: an experiment in integrated understanding. Res. Rep. 158, Yale Computer 
Science Department, New Haven, Conn. (1979). 
18. E. Charniak, With spoon in hand this must be the eating frame. In Proc. 2nd Workshop on Theoretical Issues in 
Natural Language Processing, University of Illinois, Urbana, III. (1978). 
19. S. Fahlman, NETL: A System fo; Representing and Using Real-World Knowledge. M.I.T. Press, Cambridge. Mass. 
(1979). 
20. M. Lebowitz, Generalization and memory in an integrated understanding system. Computer Science, Res. Rep. 186, 
Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. (1980). 
21. C. Schmidt and N. Sridharan, Plan recognition using a hypothesize and revise paradigm: an example. In Proc. 5th Inf. 
Joint Con/. Artificial Intelligence, pp. 48w86, 1977. 
Understanding novel language 147 
22. J. Doyle, Truth maintenance systems for problem solving. M.I.T. AI. Tech. Rep. TR-419, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass. 
(1978). 
23. P. H. Winston, Learning structural descriptions from examples. Rep. AI TR-231, MIT. A.I. Lab., Cambridge, Mass. 
24. M. Fox and R. Reddy, Knowledge-guided learning of structural descriptions. In Proc. 5fh IJCAI, Cambridge, Mass., 
1977. 
25. E. Soloway, Learning = interpretation + generalization: a case study in knowledge-driven learning. COINS Tech. Rep. 
78-13, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass. (1978). 
26. D. B. Lenat, AM: an artificial intelligence approach to discovery in mathematics as heuristic search. SAIL-AIM-286, 
Standord University (1976). 
27. J. Fodor, The Language of Thought. Crowell, New York (1975). 
28. R. Jackendoff, A system of semantic primitives. In Theoretical Issues in Natural Language Processing (Edited by R. 
Schank and B. Nash-Weber). ACL, Arlington, Virginia (1975). 
29. R. C. Schank, The primitive ACTS of conceptual dependency. In Theorefical Issues in Natural Language Processing 
(Edited by R. Schank and B. Nash-Webber). ACL, Arlington, Virginia. 
30. C. Rieger, The commonsense algorithm as a basis for computer models of human memory, inference, belief and 
contextual language comprehension. In Theoretical Issues in Natural Language Processing (Edited by R. Schank and 
B. Nash-Webber), pp. 180-195. ACL, Arlington, Virginia (1975). 
31. D. L. Waltz, Event shape diagrams. Proc. 2nd Ann. Nat. Con!. Artificial Intelligence, Pittsburgh, Penn., August 1981. 
32. D. Genter, Talk presented to the Conf. Cognitive Sci. Sot., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.. June 1980. 
33. N. Cercone, A note on representing adjectives and adverbs. In Proc. IJCAI-77, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass., pp. 139-140, 
August 1977. 
34. K. D. Forbus, Qualitative process theory. A.I. Memo 664, M.I.T. AI. Laboratory, Cambridge, Mass. (1982). 
35. C. R. Perrault and P. R. Cohen, It’s for your own good: a note on inaccurate reference. in Elemenrs of Discourse 
Undersfanding (Edited by Joshi, Sag and Webber). pp. 217-230, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass. (1981). 
36. M. Selfridge, A process model of language acquisition. Yale Computer Science Res. Rep 172, Ph.D. dissertation, Yale 
University, New Haven Conn. (1980). 
37. R. Fikes, P. Hart, and N. Nilsson, Learning and executing generalized robot plans, Artificial Jntell. 3(3), (1972). 
38. J. Kolodner, Retrieval and organizational strategies in conceptual memory: a computer model, Yale Computer Science 
Res. Rep. 187, Ph.D. dissertation. Yale University, New Haven, Conn. (1980). 
